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Introduction 
The presence of women on corporate boards and their impact on board effectiveness is now one of the 
most contentious issues in corporate governance. This arises from the relatively low, though 
increasing, number of female directors on boards around the world, despite an increasing number of 
well-qualified women in the labour force. Although gender discrimination is unlawful, there is a 
perception that many women still encounter invisible barriers to promotion, in effect facing a ‘glass 
ceiling’ where they can see, but not reach, high-level corporate positions. Companies that do not 
appoint women to their boards run the risk of suffering inferior performance as they fail to make use 
of the intellectual and social capital that women offer. 
We describe a theoretical framework that can be used to understand the impact of board 
gender diversity on board effectiveness and firm performance, and highlight four key theories: agency 
theory, resource dependency theory, gender role theory and upper echelons theory. We also review the 
arguments in the corporate governance literature for greater female boardroom representation. We 
begin with the ethical case and then consider the business case. The former is concerned with the 
principle that there should be no discrimination in the workplace, while the latter focuses on the 
benefits that women bring to the boardroom by drawing from a broader talent pool of directors. We 
also review the possible costs associated with an increase in the gender balance of boards. 
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The main public policy to improve the gender diversity of boards is the gender quota, 
which 12 European countries have introduced on either a voluntary or mandatory basis. 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway now have mandatory quotas ranging 
from 30 to 40 per cent female membership, while Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Slovenia and Spain have voluntary quotas. The European Commission has proposed 
legislation with the objective of achieving a 40 per cent presence of the under-represented 
gender in non-executive board-member positions in publicly listed companies (European 
Commission, 2012). In the UK, the approach to board-level gender diversity has been less 
prescriptive. The Davies Report (2011) on Women on Boards focused attention on the paucity 
of female directors and included a recommendation that 25 per cent of board members should 
be female by 2015. However, when amended in 2012, the UK Corporate Governance Code 
did not include this target, only requiring listed companies to establish a policy concerning 
boardroom diversity, including measurable objectives for implementing the policy. Despite 
these various European initiatives, the proportion of women on European boards is still only 
17 per cent, with women more likely to fill the role of independent, non-executive directors 
rather than executive positions (Heidrick and Struggles, 2013). 
The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the evidence, both positive and negative, 
concerning the effectiveness of greater female boardroom participation in improving business 
performance and highlights the methodological issues that need to be tackled in order to better 
understand the nature of the relationship between board gender composition and financial 
performance. 
Women in the Boardroom: The Theoretical Framework 
Theories that facilitate understanding of the impact of board gender diversity on board effectiveness 
and firm performance can be found in both the economics literature and the management literature. 
From the former, agency theory can be used to understand the monitoring role of boards, while from 
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the management literature, resource dependency theory, gender role theory and upper echelons theory 
can all inform understanding of the gender-specific attributes of boardroom roles. 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory is concerned with the inherent conflicts between the interests of agents (directors and 
senior managers) and the interests of the principals (owners) whose capital is at risk. Boards perform 
an important dual role as both monitors and advisers (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). There is evidence 
that female board members are likely to take a more active role compared to their male counterparts 
(Virtanen, 2012). Women are also more likely to ask questions in the boardroom (Bilimoria and 
Wheeler, 2000), to debate issues (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2005), to exhibit participative leadership 
and collaboration skills (Eagly and Johnson, 1990) and to apply higher ethical standards (Pan and 
Sparks, 2012). The ability of women to influence board decisions seems to increase with their 
numbers, particularly for boards with more than one woman (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000) or three 
women (Konrad and Kramer, 2006; Torchia et al., 2011). There is also evidence that female board 
members are better prepared for meetings (Pathan and Faff, 2013) and that they attend more board 
meetings (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). The weight of evidence from these studies suggests that female 
directors can enhance board monitoring and thereby improve firm performance. 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory considers how external resources affect firm behaviour (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). In this context, directors can provide access to valuable knowledge and expertise 
through their social networks and their relationships with key outsiders such as regulators and 
financiers (Hillman et al., 2002). When considering directors as resource providers, gender diversity 
becomes important as women may bring unique and valuable resources and relationships to their 
boards. There is evidence that female managers generally have more diverse social networks (Ibarra, 
1992, 1993). There is also evidence that women may understand certain markets and consumers better 
than men (Arfken et al., 2004). Research also suggests that female directors are more likely to have 
non-business backgrounds and thus a diversity of perspectives that can enhance overall creativity and 
innovation in problem solving (Hillman et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2008). 
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Gender Role Theory 
Gender role theory suggests that an individual’s gender is an important determinant of his or her 
behaviour and influence over others (Eagly, 1987). The theory is based on the premise that the 
behaviour of men and women is assessed in terms of societal expectations of how their gender ought 
to behave. Those who use tactics aligned to their gender tend to be perceived better by others (Eagly et 
al., 1995). Gender role theory describes how men and women have normatively prescribed behaviour 
with respect to the way in which they communicate with and influence others. For example, women 
are expected to display more feminine characteristics such as sympathy, while men are expected to be 
more assertive (Eagly, 1987). Another gender role associated with women is flexibility, with the 
notion that women are better at managing ambiguous situations (Rosener, 1995). Gender roles are 
relevant to boardroom dynamics, as directors must use communication tactics that are effective in 
influencing other board members. Gender roles are also particularly important in male-dominated 
realms such as the board of directors where esteem is crucial to effectiveness (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). The gender role theory literature contains ideas that help explain why women are under-
represented in business as well as arguments suggesting that greater board gender diversity can 
improve firm performance. 
Upper Echelons Theory 
Upper echelons theory describes how the behaviour of executives may be explained by personal 
experiences and values that determine their cognitive frames when making decisions and thus firm 
outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). Because men and women may differ in their 
cognitive frames, board gender diversity is likely to influence firm performance (Carpenter, 2002). 
Female directors are likely to bring different cognitive frames to a board due to differences in their 
experiences and knowledge, thus expanding the available pool of knowledge. For example, female 
directors tend to have more university degrees than male directors and to have more advanced degrees 
(Carter et al., 2010; Hillman et al., 2000). Female directors bring different experiences and knowledge 
by virtue of the route they have taken to the boardroom: they are less likely to have been CEOs and are 
more likely to come from non-business backgrounds (Hillman et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2008). 
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Female directors may also have different cognitive frames by virtue of their roles and 
experiences outside of the workplace. Women have more influence over household purchasing 
decisions (Phipps and Burton, 1998) and so they are likely to enhance boardroom understanding of 
consumer markets (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000; Carter et al., 2003). In addition, female directors 
have a more diverse set of non-work activities and a greater interest in philanthropy and community 
service, which are likely to benefit firms’ multiple stakeholders (Groysberg and Bell, 2013). In sum, 
the upper echelons theory literature provides a range of arguments relating to the female cognitive 
frame which suggest that greater female board representation may improve the quality of boardroom 
discussion and decision making, which ultimately feeds through into stronger financial performance. 
Arguments for Greater Female Boardroom Representation 
The arguments for greater female representation in the boardroom are sourced from the foregoing 
theoretical framework and thus draw upon ideas that can be found in agency theory, resource 
dependency theory, gender role theory and upper echelons theory. This multi-theoretical lens is a 
powerful tool with which to illuminate the business case for more women at the boardroom level, 
which is based on the additional economic value that their presence can create. These theories also 
assist in understanding the reasons why women are under-represented at the boardroom level; 
however, the ethical case for more female directors itself rests upon the principle of social justice, 
namely that the appointment of women to boards is justified solely on the normative basis of equality 
of opportunity and non-discrimination. In the interests of balance, we also consider the additional costs 
that may arise from greater board gender diversity. 
The Ethical Case for Greater Female Board Representation 
The ethical case for greater female representation in the boardroom is based on the proposition that it 
is immoral for women to be excluded from corporate boards on the grounds of gender and that 
increasing gender diversity achieves a more equitable outcome for society. There are two major causes 
of discrimination against women in business that result in their reduced presence on company boards: 
the ‘double burden’ syndrome and the ‘glass ceiling’. In most societies, women are at the centre of 
family life and often have to combine work with household responsibilities, and thus face a ‘double 
burden’ (McKinsey, 2007). Due to the need for career breaks because of childbirth and the subsequent 
126 
 
care of children, women often face a natural handicap compared to men in terms of workplace 
advancement. 
The ‘glass ceiling’ metaphor was coined by the Wall Street Journal in a 1986 special report 
and refers to an invisible barrier that prevents women from reaching top positions in business (Wall 
Street Journal, 1986). It is the most frequently cited discriminatory barrier facing women. The 
metaphor stems primarily from the historically determined perception of the roles of women in society 
(Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994). In the past, women were perceived to have lower ambitions, self-
confidence and assertiveness relative to men, and to possess poor leadership skills (Powell, 1999). 
They are therefore confronted with a ‘glass ceiling’ that prevents them from reaching the visible, but 
unattainable, upper echelons of the corporate world. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, most countries gradually introduced gender 
equality into all areas of life, but as late as in the 1960s in the US, women were still expected to 
primarily take care of their families. Typical occupations in which women were prevalent included 
nursing, teaching and various forms of volunteering, which explains why women play a major role in 
the public sector to this day. When women started to enter the business world, they initially took 
positions requiring abilities that corresponded to their previous occupations and roles in society. Thus, 
they mostly supported the work of others (for example, as secretaries) or held positions in human 
resources or communications (Rosener, 1990). 
Despite progress being made in terms of combating discrimination and challenging 
stereotypes about the perceived roles of women in society, the glass ceiling seems to be deeply rooted 
in the culture of many organisations. In a questionnaire survey conducted by McKinsey (2007), 27 per 
cent of women admitted to being discriminated against in the workplace. Interestingly, women who 
hold corporate managerial positions or senior political office sometimes reinforce the ‘glass ceiling’. 
Sometimes this phenomenon takes an extreme form, described by Terjesen and Singh (2008) as the 
‘queen bee’ syndrome, whereby older women in positions of power resent younger colleagues and 
deliberately make it difficult for them to achieve their career objectives, preferring to promote and 
surround themselves with men. An often-cited example is the former UK Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, who is alleged to have done little to promote other women while in office (Smith, 2000). 
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Various initiatives to promote gender equality are gradually helping women to break through 
the ‘glass ceiling’, but it is arguably just as important to overcome the ‘double burden’ syndrome 
arising from the central role played by women in the family. Women’s roles in this respect differ 
across countries depending on cultural factors, economic development and infrastructure (for example, 
the availability of social services and tax policy concerning working mothers). As a result, the 
presence of women on boards varies across countries according to these differing social, political and 
economic factors. Countries with more women in senior management roles and smaller gender pay 
gaps tend to have more diverse corporate boards (Terjesen and Singh, 2008). However, as a result of 
their family responsibilities, women face greater difficulties reconciling their professional and 
domestic lives, which often leads to limited professional development prospects or the necessity of 
trading off family life against careers. Due to the latter choice, women often exhibit smaller 
professional ambitions and so many more women than men voluntarily leave their careers to devote 
themselves to their families (Hewlett and Luce, 2005). 
Due to the ‘double burden’ syndrome and its associated choices, women at higher levels in 
companies often have fewer children or no children at all. Hewlett (2002) reports that as many as 49 
per cent of women aged 41–55 in the highest paid category (earning over $100,000 a year) were 
childless. Similarly, McKinsey (2007) reports that 54 per cent of women holding middle and top 
management positions in European and US companies did not have children. 
It is possible that social pressure to increase the participation of women on company boards 
may give rise to token appointments, whereby women are chosen solely to represent their gender 
(Kanter, 1977). For instance, Carver (2002) suggests that companies have a tendency to exhibit 
‘tokenism’ in their board appointments to legitimise the composition of the board. In this case, women 
are treated first of all as representatives of their gender, with their role as board members coming 
second. The opinions of token board members do not always get the same treatment as that given to 
those of male members, and so the benefits of board diversity are lost (Sheridan and Milgate, 2005). 
While one woman on a board may be only a token appointment and two may be insufficient to 
change a firm’s policies, three may constitute the ‘critical mass’ necessary to make a noticeable impact 
(Rosener, 1990). This view is supported by Erkut et al. (2009), who find that women on boards with 
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three or more women members are more likely to feel comfortable raising issues and taking an active 
role. Brown et al. (2002) find that boards with three or more female members behave differently from 
those consisting exclusively of men and are more likely to have conflict-of-interest guidelines and 
formal codes of conduct. 
The tokenistic approach to women on corporate boards is supported by Farrel and Hersch 
(2005), who find that the likelihood of appointing women is negatively correlated with the number of 
directors appointed in previous years, and that this likelihood increases if a woman leaves the board. 
Their study suggests that in many cases, it is gender rather than competence that is decisive in the 
appointment of female directors. 
Social pressure to appoint women to corporate boards may also contribute to negative 
perceptions of female boardroom candidates. Ryan and Haslam (2005, 2007) argue that women who 
break through the ‘glass ceiling’ to the boardroom are often appointed by companies that find 
themselves in a difficult financial situation and are thus confronted with a ‘glass cliff’ effect, given the 
heightened risk of failure. If and when that failure occurs, female directors are often singled out for 
criticism, despite financial problems pre-dating their appointment. 
While the case for more women on boards is most often based on the business advantages 
associated with greater female participation in decision making, the ethical case suggests that gender 
should not be a reason for discrimination and that firms should regard greater female representation 
not as a means to an end, but as a desirable end in itself (Brammer et al., 2007). In fact, there is 
evidence that having more women in the boardroom enhances corporate ethical behaviour. For 
example, the presence of women on the board is associated with higher earnings quality (Gul et al., 
2011) and better oversight of management reporting that reduces earnings management (Srinidhi et al., 
2011). 
The Business Case for Greater Female Board Representation 
The business case for greater female board representation is based on the premise that women provide 
an extra dimension to boardroom dynamics that enhances the operation of the board and its 
governance, which should ultimately be reflected in improved financial performance. The business 
case revolves around four potential benefits provided by female directors: improved boardroom 
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creativity and decision making; the provision of access to the widest talent pool; increased 
responsiveness to the marketplace; and the achievement of better corporate governance. We consider 
each of these in turn. 
A substantial body of research has shown that groups that are more diverse in terms of age, 
gender or education behave differently from uniform groups (Erhardt et al., 2003). For example, 
diverse groups do much better in a turbulent environment, as exemplified by the recent global 
financial crisis, where the need for more knowledge and information was critical (Rost and Osterloh, 
2010). Members of homogeneous groups tend to communicate with each other more frequently and 
reach a consensus more often. Such groups face a lower risk of conflict and tend to make decisions 
faster (Earley and Mosakowski, 2000; Lau and Murnighan, 1998). More women on the board can 
enhance business performance through greater creativity of thought in the decision-making process 
and the provision of a wider range of perspectives (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). A more gender 
diverse board is therefore less likely to suffer from ‘group think’, which typically manifests itself as a 
sense of infallibility, excessive optimism and disregard for the opinions of persons outside the group 
(Watson et al., 1993). Members of boards that suffer from ‘group think’ often practise self-censorship 
as they are reluctant to express opinions that might put them at risk of criticism from other board 
members and, as a consequence, alienation. The impact made by women appears to improve once a 
threshold level of women in leadership positions is reached, with a critical mass of 30 per cent or more 
women at board level or in senior management producing the best financial results (McKinsey, 2007). 
It is a truism to say that corporate self-interest is served by appointing the best candidates to 
the boardroom, so choices should logically be made from the widest talent pool irrespective of gender. 
In many countries, women form an increasing proportion of the labour force and increasingly they are 
more highly educated than men. In North America, around six out of every 10 university graduates is a 
woman, with the same trend evident in many emerging economies (Maitland, 2010). More than half of 
the students graduating from Europe’s universities are women (European Commission, 2012). Given 
the increasing educational attainment of women, it is natural to expect their representation in 
boardrooms to increase and business performance to improve as a result. 
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All corporate boards comprise individuals with varying competencies who, in aggregate, 
constitute the board’s social and intellectual capital. By appointing women to corporate boards, 
shareholders can not only make better use of the available intellectual capital, but can also add value 
because of the high educational attainment of women (Daily et al., 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001). This capital consists not only of the knowledge contributed by women, but also the value 
produced by them in the process of strategic decision making. The diversity in outlook provided by 
women may help enhance board decision making by increasing the number of alternatives considered, 
the quality of ideas discussed and provoking livelier boardroom discussions (Letendre, 2004). Boards 
with female members who have different values are also more likely to consider counter-arguments 
and to question conventional wisdom (Bilimoria and Huse, 1997; Huse and Solberg, 2006). Based on 
survey data from Norwegian firms, Nielsen and Huse (2010) find that female directors influence board 
strategic involvement through their contribution to board decision making, which in turn depends on 
their professional experiences and different values. 
According to recent estimates, women control about 70 per cent of global consumer spending 
(O’Donnell and Kennedy, 2011). More women in the boardroom can therefore provide a better 
understanding of consumers’ choices and help create products and services that are more responsive to 
their needs and preferences. This knowledge varies across industry sectors and is reflected in a UK 
study showing that the highest rates of female directors are found in those sectors that address their 
products to the final customer, the so-called ‘consumer-facing’ sectors – retail, utilities, media and 
banking – and are lower in those sectors that do not (Brammer et al., 2007). 
The presence of more women in the boardroom can enhance corporate governance by 
increasing the independence of the board and thus sharpening the scrutiny of executive decision 
making. Farrell and Hersch (2005) argue that since women historically have limited experience of 
executive roles, it is reasonable to believe that they will improve board independence, and they 
document that most new female directors appointed to the boards of a sample of US firms from 1990 
to 1999 are outsiders. Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that female directors are more likely to 
exhibit independence of thought because they are not members of ‘old boys’ networks’. Their analysis 
of a sample of US firms covering the period 1996 to 2003 finds that female directors have better 
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attendance records at board meetings than male directors, that male directors have fewer attendance 
problems the more gender-diverse the board is, and that women are more likely to join monitoring-
related board committees. They also find that more gender diverse boards are more likely to hold 
CEOs to account, given that CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock return performance in firms with 
relatively more women on boards. These results all suggest that more gender-diverse boards allocate 
greater effort to monitoring. 
The Possible Costs of Greater Female Board Representation 
While the business case for greater board gender diversity is based on the potential benefits arising 
from the presence of women in the boardroom, this presence also has potential costs (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). Because the proportion of women in top executive positions is small, albeit growing, 
employing more female directors may produce a board with a low average age that lacks experience. 
Furthermore, because qualified candidates are likely to be in short supply, they are likely to 
accumulate multiple board seats, and such ‘busy’ directors are arguably less effective than less busy 
ones. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) report the impact of the new law introduced by Norway in 2003 
requiring that 40 per cent of listed company directors be women by 2008. They observe that the 
average proportion of female directors in listed firms was about 10 per cent when the gender balance 
law was passed. During the next five years, firms complying with the 40 per cent quota replaced about 
one-third of their male directors with women. The number of female directorships increased by 260% 
(from 165 to 592 seats), while the number of male directorships dropped by 38% (from 1,516 to 938 
seats). Crucially, they find that the new law led to younger and less experienced boards and a drop in 
market performance. 
Further evidence on the impact of the 40 per cent board gender quota in Norway is provided 
by Bøhren and Staubo (2013), who find that the recruitment of female directors with multiple seats 
was not a widespread strategy to comply with the quota. They suggest that a possible reason for this is 
that shareholders fear that busy directors may easily become overstretched and therefore have less 
value or, alternatively, that the pool of females who could potentially hold multiple directorships was 
so small that this source of recruitment did not matter much. A related study by Bøhren and Staubo 
(2014) finds that the introduction of the 40 per cent quota in Norway law led to a reduction in board 
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independence, which is a more widespread property among female director candidates than among 
males. They also report that approximately half of the Norwegian firms exposed to the 40 per cent 
quota changed their organisational form to avoid the legal requirement to adopt the quota and that 
some firms consciously avoided adopting the organisational form exposed to the new law. 
Another potential cost associated with increasing gender diversity is the possibility of 
communication breakdowns between top executives and minority outside directors. As Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) point out, outside directors rely on executives to gain access to firm-specific 
information. Executives may perceive female directors as sharing different values and espousing 
dissimilar views. The reluctance of executives to share information with minority outside directors 
could compromise board effectiveness. 
Increasing board gender diversity may also result in the recruitment of directors more 
interested in pushing their own personal agenda than in safeguarding the interests of shareholders. For 
example, according to some studies, women pay greater attention to the social aspects of business and 
are more willing than men to use company resources to support charities and various groups of 
stakeholders, which is often inconsistent with shareholders’ expectations (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 
1994; Williams, 2003). This may be related to the different experiences of women, whose involvement 
in non-profit projects is typically more substantial than that of men (Wang and Coffey, 1992). 
Charitable activities may turn out to be beneficial for companies in the long term, but this is difficult 
to verify empirically, even though such involvement may improve a firm’s image and boost employee 
morale. 
Women on the Board and Firm Financial Performance: Evidence 
We now turn our attention to the empirical studies that investigate the relationship between female 
boardroom representation and firm financial performance. These studies generally test for a direct 
relationship between the presence, or proportion, of female directors and financial performance. The 
measures of firm performance in these studies include both accounting-based measures such as return 
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), employee productivity and return on invested capital 
(ROIC), and market-based measures such as the market-to-book ratio, Tobin’s q and shareholder 
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returns. The evidence is mixed. Some find a positive relationship (for example, Carter et al., 2003; 
Erhardt et al., 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008, 2010), while others find either a negative 
relationship (for example, Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; Minguez-Vera and Martin, 2011) or an 
insignificant relationship (for example, Shrader et al., 1997; Rose, 2007; Carter et al., 2010). In order 
to better understand the reasons for these conflicting results, we briefly explain the methodological 
challenges involved in testing the impact of board gender diversity and firm performance, and we 
conclude with the lessons that can be drawn from the results of a comprehensive meta-analysis by Post 
and Byron (2014). 
A frequently cited study documenting a positive relationship between the gender and ethnic 
diversity of the board and corporate performance, as proxied by Tobin’s q, is that of Carter et al. 
(2003). A further study by Carter et al. (2010) reports additional evidence consistent with a positive 
impact of gender diversity on the market value of firms. Erhardt et al. (2003) provide evidence that 
board diversity is positively correlated with accounting measures of performance. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) find an initially positive relationship between financial performance, measured by both Tobin’s 
q and ROA, and the fraction of women on boards, controlling for other corporate governance 
variables. The authors then go on to address the important issue of possible endogeneity in the 
relationship between firm performance and board gender. This may arise from reverse causality (rather 
than female directors improving firm performance, better-performing firms may simple attract more 
female directors) or from omitted variable bias (the possibility that there is an underlying missing 
variable that influences both board gender diversity and firm performance). For example, gender 
diversity could be correlated with omitted firm-specific variables such as corporate culture such that 
more progressive firms may perform better and also have more female directors. When they include 
firm fixed effects to take account of the possibility of an omitted variable, the sign of the estimated 
coefficient on the fraction of female directors in their regression model changes from positive to 
negative and is statistically significant, albeit at the 10 per cent level. This result casts doubt on a 
causal interpretation of the widely documented positive relationship between firm performance and 
women on boards. Since the results of regression models that use fixed effects do not establish the 
direction of causality, Adams and Ferreira (2009) also use an instrumental variable (IV) approach, 
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employing the number of male director connections to female directors on other boards as an 
instrument for the fraction of women on boards. Once again, they find that the impact of an increase in 
the fraction of female directors on both Tobin’s q and ROA is negative. 
The key message from the work of Adams and Ferreira (2009) is that some firms are likely to 
benefit from more gender diversity, while others are not. Based on attendance records, they argue that 
female directors are more likely to be tough monitors. However, because an excessive emphasis on 
monitoring can sometimes be counterproductive, additional monitoring can reduce performance in 
firms that are otherwise well governed. 
An alternative method for determining the direction of causality is to look for a so-called 
natural experiment – an exogenous change in the environment that forces firms to alter the 
composition of their boards. In this regard, Ahern and Dittmar (2009) exploit the introduction of the 
mandatory 40 per cent female board quota in Norway. They find that firms that adjust to this new level 
suffer an abnormal decline in market value. 
Most of the research on the relationship between board gender and firm performance is 
focused on a single country, which has led to calls for more multi-country studies to ascertain the 
extent to which results may be influenced by differences in social and cultural factors across countries 
(Terjesen and Singh 2008; Grosvold and Brammer, 2010). These calls are addressed by Terjesen et al. 
(2015), who use data from 3,876 public firms in 47 countries and find that firms with more female 
directors have higher market-based (Tobin’s q) and accounting-based (ROA) performance, controlling 
for a wide set of corporate governance mechanisms and for endogeneity. Acknowledging the fact that 
the corporate governance literature has focused more on boards’ independence than their gender 
balance, the authors also address how the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance is moderated by board gender. Interestingly, they find that external independent directors 
do not contribute to firm performance unless the board is gender-diversified, suggesting that gender 
diversity might act as a substitute for board independence. From this they conclude that corporate 
governance codes worldwide should give at least the same importance to gender diversity as they give 
to the structure of board independence. 
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The lack of consistent findings in prior studies may be due to differences in measures of firm 
performance and control variables as well as differences in methodology. A useful tool that creates a 
general impression of the weight of evidence by systematically combining the results of prior studies 
is meta-analysis. In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting results in the literature, Post and Byron 
(2014) perform a meta-analysis of the results from 140 studies representing roughly 90,070 firms in 35 
countries on five continents. They find that female board representation is positively related to 
accounting returns and that the relationship is more positive in countries with stronger shareholder 
protections, perhaps because shareholder protections motivate boards to use the different knowledge, 
experience and values that each member brings to the board. The analysis also reveals that while there 
is a near-zero relationship between female board representation and market-based performance, the 
relationship is positive in countries with greater gender parity and negative in countries with low 
gender parity. The authors believe this may be a result of societal gender differences in human capital 
influencing investors’ evaluations of the future earning potential of firms that have more female 
directors. Of particular note, according to the authors, is the fact that the presence of women on the 
board is positively related to boards’ two primary responsibilities, namely monitoring and strategy 
involvement. This suggests that the influence of female directors on firm performance may operate, at 
least in part, by increasing attention on directors’ legally mandated board responsibilities. 
A limitation of the meta-analysis conducted by Post and Byron (2014) is that it is not possible 
to account for possible endogeneity caused by reverse causality or omitted variables in the relationship 
between female board representation and firm performance. Those conducting primary studies may 
employ strategies not available to meta-analysts, such as lagging dependent variables and two-stage 
least squares modelling. However, the authors made two attempts to uncover the possible influence of 
endogeneity. First, they explored whether study design (cross-sectional or lagged) moderated the 
relationship between female board representation and firm performance, and found no significant 
difference. Second, they explored whether they could eliminate the possibility that an omitted variable 
(board independence) was a source of endogeneity, and again found no significant difference in 
respect of this variable. The authors are careful, however, not to make any claims about causality, 
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noting that almost none of the studies in their meta-analysis addressed possible endogeneity, and they 
urge future researchers to address this concern. 
Conclusion 
We have outlined the arguments for greater female representation in the boardroom, drawing upon 
ideas from agency theory, resource dependency theory, gender role theory and upper echelons theory. 
This theoretical framework provides the tools to understand the business case, as well as the reasons 
for the under-representation of women at board level, and the additional costs that may arise from 
greater board gender diversity. As greater female presence in the boardroom will give rise to benefits 
and costs, the impact on boardroom efficiency and financial performance will ultimately depend upon 
the relative balance of each, which is likely to vary across firms. 
The evidence from the empirical literature on the relationship between board gender diversity 
and firm performance is inconclusive, in large part because very few studies investigate the direction 
of causality. Despite this, the global legislative agenda concerning board diversity is very much 
focused on the issue of gender, with 16 national corporate governance codes and 13 national quotas 
addressing boards’ gender structure (Terjesen et al., 2015). Unpicking the relationship between gender 
and other corporate governance variables offers the promise of enhancing understanding of how board 
gender composition influences firm performance. The recent finding that board independence is 
secondary when gender diversity is not addressed (Terjesen et al., 2015) suggests that board gender 
diversity is an important corporate governance issue that is likely to remain at the top of the policy 
agenda. A promising avenue for future research is the investigation other types of board diversity 
(such as educational background, ethnicity and age). The creation of a board diversity index by 
Anderson et al. (2011) is an example of one approach that could meaningfully extend knowledge of 
how gender interacts with other director characteristics. 
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